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The Peace Mediator Effect
A. Guazzini · G. Barnabei · T. Carletti · F.
Bagnoli · D. Vilone
Abstract Statistical mechanics has proven to be able to capture the fundamental rules
underlying phenomena of social aggregation and opinion dynamics, well studied in disci-
plines like sociology and psychology. This approach is based on the underlying paradigm
that the interesting dynamics of multi-agent systems emerge from the correct definition of
few parameters governing the evolution of each individual. Into this context, we propose
a new model of opinion dynamics based on the psychological construct named ”cognitive
dissonance”. Our system is made of interacting individuals, the agents, each bearing only
two dynamical variables (respectively “opinion” and “affinity”) self-consistently adjusted
during time evolution. We also define two special classes of interacting entities, both acting
for a peace mediation process but via different course of action: “diplomats” and “auctori-
tates”. The behavior of the system with and without peace mediators (PMs) is investigated
and discussed with reference to corresponding psychological and social implications.
Keywords opinion dynamics · complex systems · peace mediation · cognitive dissonance
1 Introduction
In recent years we have seen the emergence of a new breed of professionals broadly called
Peace Mediators, PMs for short, involved in the process of peace (re)construction. They
are deployed in countries torn by conflict or post-conflict areas in order to create conditions
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2for sustainable peace. PMs act with the goal of reduce the fragmentation among different
parts of the society until a suitable threshold, below which a widespread consensus is
achieved and peace can be maintained.
Our model is based on the assumption that it is possible to study the evolution of a
social phenomenon by directly considering a few of attributes of the individuals coupled
by specific interaction rules. For these reasons, we adopt an agent based model, in which
local rules are inspired by the cognitive dissonance [1], a cognitive construct that rules the
evolution of human social cognition [3]. According to Cognitive Dissonance Theory, when
unknown individuals interact, they experiment an internal conflicting state because of
their respective lack of information. In order to avoid the cognitive dissonance, individuals
adopt heuristics strategies making use of mental schemes1 [2]. The mutual affinity is the
mental scheme employed to overcome this lack and to perform the optimal choice in terms
of opinion production. Two heuristics strategies are generally employed:
A) if the affinity towards the interacting partner is below some threshold, then the indi-
vidual will tend to crystallize its actual opinion, while for higher values of affinity he
will change its opinion in the direction of the partner’s one;
B) if the opinion difference between the two interacting agents is below a critical value,
then each one will increase its affinity towards the partner, otherwise the affinity score
will decrease.
These two way of acting are modulated by internal factors, such as the openness of mind
and the confidence2, and external ones, such as the possibility of interacting given by its
own social system. Moreover, affinity acts as a long term memory in which individuals can
store information useful to solve similar future situations.
By formalizing agents in such a way, we will obtain a dynamical population where
interacting agents share their opinions by trying to maintain an acceptable level of dis-
sonance. The asymptotic states of such system are either a global consensus (i.e. into an
hypothetical opinion space, a mono-clustered state) or a social fragmentation (i.e. crystal-
lization of no longer interacting clusters of opinion). Of course, in the goal of PM , latter
state must be considered dangerous, since once obliged to interact, the low level of mutual
affinity and the differences in opinion, may lead to strong social contrasts between these
agents. For this reasons, the goal of PM can be translated into a reduction of the social
fragmentation, namely into a reduction of opinion distances of agents into the opinion
space.
The aim of this paper is to present two possible models of PM behavior. In the first
case, we emphasize principally the skill of interacting and negotiating with people along
large opinion distances. We label these PMs as “diplomats” and we tag their most promi-
nent characteristic as openness of mind. Classical examples are actual diplomats, transac-
tors, intermediaries, etc. On the other hand, we consider as fundamental attribute the PM
reputation. The source of information is an essential ingredient to let the information to
enter and spread into a population. We hence label this PM figure by “auctoritas”, being
characterized by an established opinion and the aptitude to influence the society by their
prestige. For sure we can set in this category Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela.
Targets of this work are to obtain a mathematical representation of both PM ’s figures
and to investigate how they can affect a formalized social system of normal agents in order
to reach a widespread social consensus.
1 Symbolic and synthetic representations builded up through inferential, imaginative and emo-
tional processes. Because of mental schemes can be upgraded in real time during interactions with
other individuals, they are used as a guidance for quick decisions in stereotypical situations.
2 The openness of mind is the limit of permissiveness that individual introduces interacting with
other people. It allows to ignore the perception of incompatibilities existing between oneself and
others and consequently to interact with individuals having very distant opinions. The confidence
is the minimal reputation required to accept instance from others.
3The paper is organized as follows. The next section is dedicated to describe the model.
In forthcoming section we present numerical simulations. Fifth section is devoted to essen-
tial results and in the last section we will sum up and talk about future perspectives.
2 The Model
The adopted model has already been studied in [3,4,5]. Hereby we briefly recall its main
features. The model is characterized by a continuous opinion and a random binary en-
counter dynamics. We consider a system composed by N autonomous agents, the individ-
uals, each one characterized by the two constant parameters ∆Oc and αc, respectively the
openness of mind and the confidence. Agents are also described by the two variables α
and O, respectively affinity and opinion, ∈ [0, 1] and self-consistently adjusted during time
evolution according to the following update laws:
O
t+1
i = O
t
i − µ ∆O
t
ij Γ1(α
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t
ij + α
t
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where the functions Γ1 and Γ2 respectively read:
Γ1(α
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ij) =
1
2
[tanh (β1 (α
t
ij − αc)) + 1] (3)
Γ2(∆Oij) = − tanh (β2 (|∆O
t
ij | −∆Oc)) (4)
being ∆Otij the difference at time t between the two opinion values of the interacting
partners, µ a convergence parameter and β1 and β2 set large enough to consider the
activating functions as step functions.
At each step t two interacting agents are selected as follows: the i-th agent is drawn
with uniformly distributed probability from the population, while the j-th one is the one
who minimize the social metric:
D
t
ij = d
t
ij + η(0, σ) (5)
composed by the two terms, respectively the social distance:
d
t
ij = ∆O
t
ij(1− α
t
ij) j = 1, ..., N j 6= i (6)
and the gaussian noise (η) with mean value zero and variance σ, called social temperature
[2], modulating the mixing degree in the population.
Being the ultimate goal of PMs the reduction of social fragmentation, both diplomats
and auctoritates will act in this direction, but via different courses of action. Diplomats are
assumed to have a larger ∆Oc then normal agents and consequently they can interact in
the opinion space with far away agents. According to Eq. 1, this way of acting will lead to
an increase of the individuals affinity towards diplomats. On the other hand, auctoritates
are assumed to employ their notoriety; this is translated in our model by imposing that
all agents have a larger affinity value towards them, directly promoting the convergence
into opinion space.
3 Numerical simulations
Simulations are performed with following parameters. N is fixed once for all to 100, includ-
ing PMs. The social temperature η(0, σ), the affinity threshold αc and the convergence
parameter µ are fixed once for all, respectively at 0.003, 0.5 and 0.5. Normal agents have
a ∆Oc = 0.2, while for diplomats ∆Oc = 0.5. Entries in the affinity matrix α are initial-
ized between normal agents with uniformly distributed probability in [0, 0.5], while entries
corresponding to normal agents towards auctoritates are set at 0.75.
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Fig. 1 Typical opinion trajectories. Each time step are 104 interactions. a) Normal agents (see
ref. [3]); b) Normal agents (black) and diplomats (red); c) Normal agents (black) and auctoritates
(red).
We have considered both the fraction of PMs over the entire population and their
distribution in the opinion space as the relevant control parameters, hereby measuring the
mean number of survived clusters at the equilibrium over 100 runs. The range of employed
PMs is from 5% to 50% in steps of 5%3.
Runs are stopped when the system converge to an equilibrium asymptotic state. We
define such a state is reached when the affinity matrix will no longer change. We know that
for communities larger than 20 agents, the system converge with respect to the opinion
before than respect to the affinity [5]. Hence, when affinity reaches a state where it no
longer evolves, the whole system, i.e. also the opinion, will freeze. Such asymptotic state
will be characterized by the number of clusters in the opinion dimension.
Scenarios. The behavior of the two PMs figures are separately studied in a starting
system which entries of opinion vectorO are initialized uniformly spaced in [0, 1]. Diplomats
are distributed along the opinion space by substituting them to the already initialized
normal agents and according with the following modalities. In the “uniform” distribution
diplomats are spread along the opinion space with uniformly distributed probability; in
the “gaussian” one with a gaussian distribution (mean 0.5, standard deviation 0.2); in the
“bimodal” distribution they are inserted with a bimodal distribution.
The same opinion vector initialization and distribution strategies are used for auctori-
tates, with the addition of a “delta” strategy in which all auctoritates are grouped around
the center of the opinion space, namely around 0.5.
The “two opposing factions” case. Hereby we propose an application of the model.
We consider a starting opinion space in which agents are divided into two large clusters,
such that their respective opinion distances are larger than the opinion threshold of any
single agent. In such a way, there is no possibility of interaction between agents belonging
to the two different groups. Nevertheless, diplomats are able to interact with both factions
because of their large openness of mind, while auctoritates can attract individuals because
of their high reputation. We thus compare the two different courses of action.
4 Results
Figure 1 shows typical trajectories into the opinion space of a system of normal agents
(1a), a system influenced by diplomats (1b) and a system influenced by auctoritates (1c),
respectively. While the system of normal agents quickly converge to a fragmented asymp-
totic state, the insertion of PMs increases the convergence time needed as so as the chances
of obtaining a mono-clustered state. We remark the different courses of action of the two
3 We remark that, so as formalized, the increase of fraction of PMs can corresponds respectively
either to a fixed number of PMs having to do with smaller group, or to a population having a
higher mean ∆Oc (diplomats).
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Fig. 2 Behavior of a system modulated by diplomats, spread as in legend. a) Mean number of sur-
vived clusters at the equilibrium as a function of the fraction of diplomats. b) Probability of having
N clusters at the equilibrium in a single run, 5% of diplomats (upper figure), 50% of diplomats
(lower). For sake of clearness, the histograms are interpolated by ninth degree polynomials.
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Fig. 3 Behavior of a system modulated by auctoritates, spread as in legend. a) Mean number of
survived clusters at the equilibrium as a function of the fraction of auctoritates. b) Probability
of having N clusters at the equilibrium in a single run, 5% of auctoritates (upper figure), 50%
of auctoritates (lower). For sake of clearness, the histograms are interpolated by ninth degree
polynomials.
PMs. Because of the great ∆Oc value, diplomat increases affinity towards neighbourhood,
approaches partner and inclines it towards its own opinion. Agents inside the opinion
bounds of diplomat have a larger probability of collapse in the same final position, and
the diplomat has the possibility to explore the entire opinion space. On the other hand,
auctoritas tends to reach the equilibrium with the same opinion value with respect to the
initial condition. In this latter case, the affinities of normal agents towards auctoritates
trigger the convergence dynamics to monocluster.
Figure 2 resumes results relative to diplomats. The insertion of diplomats reduces the
mean degree of fragmentation at equilibrium. Moreover, this reduction is linear and pos-
itively correlate with the fraction of employed diplomats. Although the three distribution
strategies have similar trends (Fig. 2a), by augmenting the fraction of diplomats, the gaus-
sian one tends to reach the greater number of mono-clusters at equilibrium (Fig. 2b,
lower).
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Fig. 4 Behavior of a bi-clustered starting system, spread as in legend. Mean number of survived
clusters at the equilibrium as a function of the fraction of PMs, spread as in legend. a) Acting
diplomats; b) acting auctoritates.
Figure 3 resumes results relative to auctoritates. Once more the insertion of PMs
reduces the mean degree of fragmentation at equilibrium, but hereby the adopted distri-
bution strategies significatively influence results of simulations (Fig. 3a). By varying the
employed fractions of auctoritates, gaussian and, mainly, delta distributions show best
trends in terms of convergence to a mono-cluster state. The bimodal distribution tends to
converge to a bi-clustered state (Fig. 3b, lower).
Figure 4 shows results of insertion of PMs into a bi-clustered starting population;
previous results are confirmed. Diplomats become efficacious only for higher fractions of
employment and mainly with a gaussian distribution. Auctoritates, spread with either
a gaussian or, above all, a delta strategy, assure the convergence to a mono-clustered
asymptotic state since lower fractions of employment.
5 Conclusions and future perspectives
In this paper we propose an application of the model of continuous opinion dynamics al-
ready introduced in [3,4,5], by inserting two figures of PMs, one by one either diplomats or
auctoritates respectively, into a population of normal agents. We describe the behavior of
the system in terms of opinion convergence and mean degree of fragmentation for different
fraction of employed PMs, also in reference to a more likely situation, namely the case
“two opposing factions”.
The typical modus operandi of diplomats becomes more effective by inserting many of
them. By referring to Note 3, both the insertion of few diplomats into groups of small size
and the increase of the mean ∆Oc value of the population would lead to the same result.
On the other hand, the promotion of few auctoritates, but in suitable positions, can assure
the convergence to a widespread consensus into populations of any sort.
The combined efforts of both the two PMs figures remain to test, as so as the effects
of the population size and the time needed by such figure in order to reach the global
consensus.
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